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The subject of Michael Collins and his role in the Anglo-Irish War of 
1919–1921 has become increasingly well-trod ground over the past decade 
or more, but J.B.E. Hittle attempts to blaze a new trail by examining the 
war not so much from the perspective of Collins's successes, but from that 
of failed opportunities on the part of the Crown's intelligence services. A 
retired thirty-one year veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, Hittle 
earned an MA in History from LSU and is considered an expert on many 
aspects of insurgency and counterterrorism. His stated intent in this work 
was to use the war "as a case study of intelligence management under con-
ditions of low-intensity conflict" (p. xiii). Hittle's Preface first provides a 
useful primer on the state of the historiography on the war, and he 
acknowledges the transformation from an Irish nationalist–centered, 
heroic view of events to one more tempered by modern critical analysis 
such as that provided by Peter Hart, whose works have provoked much 
debate among nationalists and academics alike. The rancor of that debate 
has somewhat marred the study of the subject from an Irish perspective, 
and Hittle acknowledges the difficulties of working within that troubled 
environment. Conversely, historiography on the British side has been 
much improved of late through new scholarship such as Christopher 
Andrew's 2009 history of MI5, reviewed in this publication in Vol. III, No. 
4, Winter 2010.1
In addition to the problems with historical treatments of the war, Hittle 
further cites the issues that attend the fact that few of those who have 
written about the war had any kind of practical experience with profes-
sional intelligence functions. This, he contends, has led to a lack of solid 
analysis of the intelligence struggle. While such an argument might be 
well received in the intelligence community, it is not likely to draw 
applause from academicians trained in the complexities of historical anal-
ysis. Whether or not such rigor has been applied to this subject is one 
story. Asserting that academics are incapable of doing so, however, is 
quite another story entirely. It is one that seems rather unkind at best, 
and vaguely unprofessional at worst. With Hittle's having so tweaked the 
nose of academe in view, readers of his work will no doubt be anxious to 
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discover whether his approach lives up to its stated goal, which is to ana-
lyze "Britain's counterinsurgency performance ... through analysis of 
known events measured within the context of professional intelligence 
standards" (p. xx). Only through the eyes of one steeped in the methodol-
ogies and tradecraft of intelligence, he claims, can such an analysis suc-
cessfully avoid the "polarizing debates" (p. xx) that have characterized the 
study of this topic—at least thus far.
Hittle's book contains many elements of the sort of analysis he alludes to 
in his Preface, but, by and large until his concluding chapter, he too falls 
victim to the very pitfalls for which he criticizes his colleagues. Perhaps it 
is unavoidable, but the storytelling aspects of the book bear striking 
similarity to and reliance upon the very same sort of nationalist 
hagiography he derides in his opening remarks. Moreover, the raw 
material that Hittle might have used to advantage in a fresh analysis 
seems conspicuously absent. There is little reliance on primary sources 
and much reliance on works like Christopher Andrew's Defense of the 
Realm, which is an admittedly ground-breaking work, given Andrew's 
exclusive access to hitherto-classified materials. It is not a critical failure 
of Hittle's work that he does not examine the sources himself, but it seems 
odd that an author intent on a new perspective has chosen to rely on the 
interpretations of others as the basis for making new conclusions, 
perhaps mimicking the way an intelligence operator relies on an analyst's 
product. Nonetheless, it is an interesting and well-written account, 
interspersed with some enlightening gems that mark the author as a true 
intelligence professional.
The real meat of Hittle's book, however, lies in the Conclusion. That is 
where he truly wears the mantle of his expertise and where his early 
claims show some evidence of coming to fruition. His analytical focus in 
that chapter uses a "military-centric approach" (p. 218), meaning an 
acknowledgement that Britain's primary aim was to defeat the Irish insur-
gency militarily. For a variety of reasons, the British army and its paramil-
itary forces never fully gained control or stabilized the battlefield, thus 
preventing them from proceeding to the next phase of their counterinsur-
gency mission, which should have entailed "pacification and restoration 
of civil institutions" (p. 221). Hittle next lists an array of British intelli-
gence failures in the areas of tactical or operational errors and strategic or 
administrative ones. He goes on to provide an evaluation of the IRA intel-
ligence system, crediting Michael Collins with making a sound assess-
ment of his opponent's intelligence apparatus and then developing means 
to attack its vulnerabilities. The British are labeled as arrogant, culturally 
insensitive, disorganized, inept, and plagued by bureaucratic fratricide. 
Collins' strength was to exploit all those weaknesses, yet the War for Inde-
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pendence was a near-run thing. Despite the incompetence of the British 
administrators on whom Hittle places much blame, the rank-and-file 
intelligence officers risking their lives on behalf of the Crown did yeo-
man's work that led to a number of great successes. Still, there is no con-
clusive evidence presented that Collins succeeded largely due to British 
difficulties and the mishandling of the efforts brought to bear against him. 
There is ample evidence that those problems contributed to Britain's fail-
ure. Whether the result would have been vastly different had the Crown's 
servants been more efficient is merely speculation that cannot be sup-
ported by any fact. In the end, Hittle seems to agree that Collins' direction 
of the war must receive high marks, while the British can be said to have 
been their own worst enemy in many respects.
Hittle's Conclusion, as befits his billing the work as a case study, wraps up 
with a section entitled "Lessons of the British Counterinsurgency Effort." 
He first points out the differences between short-term, reactive antiter-
rorism measures and long-term, proactive counterterrorism measures. 
The latter, due to their long-term nature, are highly dependent on good 
intelligence collection. Second, he notes that the conventional military 
effort on the part of the British Army was a doomed strategy that failed to 
recognize that it was not a war between the Army and the IRA, but a war 
between the Army and the Irish people—a war that could not be won by 
conventional means. Next, Hittle explains that disorganization and 
infighting in the intelligence bureaucracy is a debilitating handicap that 
affects morale and operational effectiveness. In this case, MI5 was ham-
strung for much of the war and was unable to contribute its developing 
professional competence to British efforts in Ireland until too late in the 
game. Hittle ends his lessons with the observations that "terrorists" need 
not exist in great numbers to accomplish their goals, and that native-born 
informants (whom he graciously terms "agents" after the British fashion) 
are the most effective means of penetrating insurgent or terrorist groups.
In sum, then, it appears that Hittle does not quite fulfill the expectations 
he sets forth at the start, but that is not to say that it is not a solid and 
useful work. In fact, it is quite good for a number of reasons. It does lay 
out in organized fashion a clear, concise, and factual tale of the respective 
flaws and merits of the British and Irish intelligence systems during the 
Irish War of Independence. His prose is clear and his conclusions and 
analyses insightful. It is probably the best single source of information on 
the topic and is most certainly worth a close look. The book would be 
useful in providing an historical example of an insurgency that 
established a long-recognized and well-used roadmap for success. It is 
instructive to have to acknowledge that those on the counterinsurgency 
side of affairs have yet to fully crack the code on battling these kinds of 
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efforts. Books of this sort enable us to rethink events and our approaches 
to them. Hittle has done us a favor by presenting a provocative analysis 
that will undoubtedly stir more new approaches in considering what 
might have been. Extending those approaches to current events is not an 
unreasonable stretch.
Edward J. Hagerty, American Military University
1   See the full text available online at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/.
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